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elimination, discouragement, or neutrality on the question of marihuana use, the Commission opted for a discouragement policy
supported by a partial prohibition.6 Adoption of some type of
regulatory scheme was rejected, although that possibility was given
serious consideration. 7 Further, the Commission Report is selfadmittedly only an interim view. A significant indication of the
continued consideration being given plans such as Kaplan's is the
recent action of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities in adopting the following resolutions:
"Resolved, That because the individual and social costs resulting from
existing laws punishing personal use or simple possession of marijuana
substantially outweigh any benefits derived, federal, state, local laws
.punishing personal use or simple possession of marijuana should be
repealed.
"Be it further resolved, That consideration be given to the feasibility of
regulating the use of marijuana by licensing its distribution." 8

Clearly, marihuana law reform is riding the wind. Every
citizen, and certainly every lawyer, ought to inform himself about
the subject. Is this recording tape a useful or suitable method to
help accomplish this? After having listened to a number of continuing education tapes with high hopes, I personally have found
recordings unsatisfactory. To some degree, this tape is no exception. While it is as entertaining and informative as any I have
encountered, listing to a tape for one hour accomplishes considerably less than an hour's reading. Another major defect with recording tapes is the absence of reference sources. While this criticism possibly reflects an ivory tower outlook, I think it is more
than that. Most lawyers object to statements of fact which must
be taken on faith. Further, anyone whose interest is piqued by a
recording winds up in the books anyhow. Perhaps no more should
be asked of recordings other than to serve as a medium to stimulate
further interest and provide a general survey of the subject. To
me, this marginal benefit hardly justifies the required expenditure
of both time and money.
Obviously I am wrong in this regard since cassette tapes on
6

First Comm'n Rep. 129-167.

'Id at 146-150.

s Stern, "Reforming Marijuana Laws," 58 Am. B.J. 727, 730 ( 1972).

,,
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legal subjects continue to pour out on the market in increasing
numbers. Thus, for the harried commuting practitioner who cannot abide the local rock radio station, I certainly recommend this
informative and entertaining tape as a useful and valuable diversion to help pass t~~ time while stuck in a traffic jam. For those
who do not need 'educational entertainment" during their commute to or from work, I recommend Kaplan's book,9 one of his
many articles, 10 and m9st certainly the Commission Report. 11
I
JoHN J. SAMPSON
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Texas at Austin School of Law
9

Note 4 supra.

lo Kaplan, "The Role of the Law in Drug Control," 1971 Duke L.J. 1065.
11

Note I supra.

THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY. Herbert Flngarette.
University of California Press. 1972. 280 pp. $10.00.

Probably no major issue in criminal law is as misunderstood,
oversimplified, and inherently mistrusted as is the concept of responsibility and its necessary corollary, the meaning of criminal
insanity. Often glossed over in the law school curriculum, blithely
ignored by judges (who often appear forever content merely to
restate hornbook black-letter law without further thought), and
simply out of the ken of most practitioners (even those with ample
criminal practices) , the problems of responsibility, sanity, and the
interplay between law and psychiatry will continue to grow in scope
and importance as caseloads increase, social and environmental
pressures expand, and the awareness that law is not a self-contained,
independent system grows.
.
Traditionally the history of the insanity defense is treated
cursorily: M'Naghten is born; M'Naghten prospers; Durham raises
questions; the ALI Model Penal Code shifts the focus; M'Naghten
-by and large-survives. Formulas are taught, and the student
is lulled into the false belief that the addition of a new word or
thought (to the "equation") will "solve" the problem, as in a tax
computation situation. That this is not so is clear; why it is not so is
somewhat hazier.
Herbert Fingarette-a philosophy professor at the University of
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California, Santa Barbara-has undertaken a more than formidable
task in The Meaning of Criminal Insanity. He sets out his aim at
once: .to explain and justify "an adequately precise definition of
insanity," one which is "thoroughly realistic from the standpoint
of case law and legal theory." 1 In an exhaustive, logical, analytical, persuasive-nearly adversarial-way, he does just that-almost. He painstakingly discusses the relation between psychiatry
and law, concludes that the scientific system is not per se more
rational and internally consistent than the criminal law system,
discards the concepts of free will and determinism as "pseudosolutions," 2 and focuses attention on the significance of the moral
values and moral sensitivity of the psychiatric expert, and how
these values are closely interwoven into the key issue of the individual's "awareness of moral attitudes in society." 3
From this point, Fingarette carefully examines and dissects the
hoary M'Naghten case and its progeny, and focuses on what he
considers the key determinant: existence of a defect in the way
one comes to and formulates decisions, intentions, and actions,4
specifically, the individual's capacity for rationality as manifested
by his responsiveness (or lack of it) to the essential relevance of
a fact pattern. If one cannot respond relevantly to that which is
essentially relevant, he is irrational, and thus not responsible orultimately-blameable. To be insane, the person's lack of capacity
to act rationally must be "part of his nature." 5 If one cannot
rationally assess the status of an act, he is, thus, not accountable
for it. 6
With this backdrop, then, Fingarette states his ultimate test of
responsibility:
"Criminal insanity existed if the individual's mental makeup at the time
of the offending act was such that he substantially lacked capacity to act
rationally with respect to the criminality of his conduct." 7
1

Pp. 1-2.

2

P. 84.

a P. 111.

• P. 157.
5

P. 195.

s To be distinguished, of course, from the person with the capacity for rationality who "simply fails to use it." P. 201.
1

P. 227.
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This test, he argues, is superior to M'Naghten (which overemphasizes the importance of knowledge in the underlying "defect of
reason"), although, somewhat surprisingly, he finds M'Naghtenif "defect of reason" is interpreted correctly-to be nearly an adequate formulation ~ He rejects Durham's use of "product" because it emphasizes causality instead of an "observed pattern of
facapacity for rational conduct." 9 Finally, the ALI Model Penal
Code variation fails: ,Its first phase ("lacks substantial capacity
... to appreciate criminality ... or to conforn1 conduct ...")
neglects to explicitlyi discuss "defect of reason"; its second (excluding an "abnormality" manifested only by "repeated criminal
conduct") is merely extraneous. By replacing all of these tests and
their variants with die question of the defendant's inherent mental
capacity for rational conduct, i.e., for responding relevantly with
respect to criminality, Fingarette argues that a "reasonable legal
standard" for criminal responsibility will finally be presented to the
often-befuddled jury in a way "essentially consistent with the most
contemporary and enlightened developments in psychiatry, philosophy and law." w
As indicated above, Fingarette is precise, pointed, and persuasive. Although the work is probably too scholarly to be read
by the trial bar, it is clearly an important work, especially in its
careful interweaving of legal and philosophical theories. As far as
the work goes, it leaves only a few areas in need of further elaboration.11
s Pp. 239-240.
9

P. 240.

10

P. 15.

11 For instance it discusses briefly the relationship of the proposed test to the
standard psychiatrlc diagnostic categories (neuroses, psychoses, and personality
disorders) and merely is satisfied to plug these definitions into the test ("Do t.he
personal\ty disorders involve a grave defect in capacity for rational co~duc.t with
respect to the criminality of the act?") (p. 233). Clearly, the determination of
whether such a "grave defect" is present must take into account a whole host of
psychological and behavioral factors scarcely alluded to . . In . thi~ regard, although
the concepts of ego/id/superego are briefly defined, their s1gmficance-a~d possible utility to the legal process-is minimized, except as they fit the test; 1.e., the
.ego's synthesis of id impulses and superego demands, combined with the ego's
perception of reality, amounts to the person's capacity to act rationally (p. 116) .
Cf. Rapaport, "The Theory of Ego Anatomy: A Generalization," 22 Bull.
Meninger Clinic 13 (1958), in Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law 300 (Katz,
Goldstein & Dershowitz, Eds. 1967).
Also, it appears that the "criminal law" is seen only as it includes crimes which
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Yet, Fingarette's analysis still fails to come to grips with an
aspect of the law of insanity and responsibility which is, perhaps,
more crucial in terms of actual trial practice and procedure than
any slight semantic difference in the various proposed tests. The
basic hostility toward and mistrust of the whole concept of an
insanity test-by the court, the · prosecution and the public-is
barely mentioned by Fingarette. Yet, the very existence of that
hostility probably is outcome--determinative of more insanity
trials than the use of one formula or another.
The reasons for this hostility are multiple and complex. First,
there exists the attitude which insists that criminals be punished
as an outlet for the internalized and moralized aggression of society
(to show that the guilty party "can't get away with it," to establish
the needed equilibrium between the id and superego functions and
thus maintain the balance between indulgence and punishment,
and to focus on the criminal as an example of the temptations which
befall the remainder of society). 1:.!
In addition, there are those psychological and social factors
which insure that the legal profession will continue to insist that
the legal system is the proper vehicle for making psychiatric determinations so that practitioners of the medical/psychotherapeutic
system must adapt themselves to the mode of the adversarial process, insuriQg the legal system's supremacy. 13 Also significant is
the motivation behind the refusal of the courts to accept much of
the body of modern psychiatric thinking, labeling it "nebulous"
are malum in se (embodying "certain fundamental values of our society" ) (p. 56) .
Clearly, the concept of responsibility is important in malum prohibitum crimes
(see, e.g., the Dean Landis or Bernard Goldfine income tax evasion cases, as well
as in noncriminal areas, such as trusts and estates, torts, domestic relations, and
copyrights) . It would be a mistake to limit the possible application of any basic
formula to only those "universally recognized" malum in se crimes (p. 212).
12 Flugel, Man, Morals and Society 169-170 (Compass ed. 1961) . This is
alluded to lightly by Fingarette merely to the extent that he terms the effect on the
public of seeing that the harmdoer does not go "scot-free" as "significant and
salutary" (p. 135).

13 For a penetrating analysis of the system of legal education, see Kennedy,
"How the Law School Fails: A Polemic," I L. & Social Action 71 (1970) . Although Fingarette tacitly acknowledges that the courts force the psychiatric witness to mold his response to accepted legal terminology (p. 31), he ultimately
concludes that the legal questions "must ultimately be answered in legal rather
than psychiatric language" (p. 69) . See State v. Maik, 60 N.J . 203, 219 (1972)
(" [l]t is for the court, rather than the hospital, to decide whether a release should
be ordered.") .
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because of its lack of "firm foundation in scientific fact." 14 And,
finally, what underlies this hostility is the unconscious refusal on
the parts of judges and prosecutors to come to grips with psychological realities about their own selves, as manifested through
their concomitant se of ego defenses such as denial and avoidance16 in an effori to forestall the inevitable discovery of potential
personality deficiencies in their own emotional makeup, which
· otherwise would very likely remain hidden beneath the extra
"layers" of superego./ not at all uncommon in the structural mental
composition of the legal practitioner.
Thus, although Fingarette has presented a clear and complete
analysis of the various theories of insanity defense, he has barely
skimmed the surface of the crucial (if hidden) issue of why the
whole sphere of criminal responsibility is treated as it is.
This is the raw nerve which still must be exposed.
MICHAEL L. PERLIN
First Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, Mercer Trial Region
State of New Jersey
14 State v. Lucas, 30 N .J. 37, 72, 152 A.2d 50 (1959). But compare the
virtual glee with which the same court accepts "scientific fact" in a situation dealing with the existence of an alleged geometric progression of drug abuse. State v.
Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 556, 170 A.2d 419 (1961) . See also State v. Thomas, 118
N.J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 1972), cert. denied 1972. Cf. State v. Maik, supra,
at 213:
"Indeed, to a psychiatrist the sick and bad are equally unfortunate. Blame is
something he leaves to the moral judgment of philosophers, and they draw
upon their unverifiable view of man and his endowments."
16 See Bibring, Dwyer, Huntington & Valenstein, "A Study of the Psychological
Processes in Pregnancy and of the Earliest Mother-Child Relationship," 16 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 62 (1961), in Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law
155-158 (Katz, Goldstein & Dershowitz, Eds. 1967) .

WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY
BREAKDOWN. Sanford N. Katz. Beacon Press. 1971. xv. 251
pp. $12.50.

The relatively recent marriage of the law to the social sciences
was one both of convenience and necessity. It is a characteristic
of that marriage that whenever a new area of societal concern
arises, one partner wanders aimlessly in the dark for awhile until
enlightened by the other, after which a mutual effort develops. As

